Percent plans, automatic admissions, and college outcomes by unknown
Daugherty et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics 2014, 3:10
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/10ORIGINAL ARTICLE Open AccessPercent plans, automatic admissions, and college
outcomes
Lindsay Daugherty1, Paco Martorell2 and Isaac McFarlin Jr3** Correspondence:
imcfar@umich.edu
3Gerald R. Ford School of Public
Policy University of Michigan, 735 S.
State Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48109,
USA
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article©
A
mAbstract
Access to selective universities is highly coveted because of the perception that
attending one provides opportunities otherwise difficult to obtain. To broaden
access to the state’s flagship universities in a manner that does not rely on
conventional affirmative action, Texas passed the Top Ten Percent Plan in 1997,
which guarantees automatic admission to any public university in the state to
students in the top decile of their high school class. We estimate the effect of
eligibility for automatic admissions on college choice and persistence for students in
a diverse urban school district. Regression discontinuity estimates show that
eligibility for guaranteed admissions has a substantial impact on enrollments at Texas
flagship universities and increases the number of semesters enrolled at flagships. The
increase in flagship enrollments appears to displace enrollments in private
universities but has no effect on overall college enrollment or the quality of college
attended. The effects are concentrated in schools that have high college-sending
rates (relative to other schools in the district), suggesting that automatic admissions
may have little effect on students in the most disadvantaged schools.
JEL: I21. Introduction
An influential body of research shows that the college wage premium has risen in re-
cent decades (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Juhn et al. 1993; Goldin and Katz, 2008). Recent
studies have also found that the return to attending higher-resource, selective colleges
may be larger than the return to attending less-selective institutions (Andrews et al.
2012; Hoekstra, 2009; Zimmerman, 2014). This differential return to selective college
attendance may be especially large for lower-income black and Hispanic students (Dale
and Krueger, 2002; 2011). Despite the relatively large returns to selective college attend-
ance among disadvantaged and underrepresented minority students, they matriculate at
much lower rates than do higher-income and white students (Bastedo and Jaquette, 2011;
Carnevale and Rose, 2004; Reardon et al. 2012).1 Thus, devising programs to close these
gaps has considerable significance for economic policy.
“Percent plans” represent an important type of policy aimed at enhancing diversity at
selective public universities.2 Currently three states, Florida, California, and Texas,
have percent plans. These plans arose as a response to legal and political pressure
against race-conscious affirmative action and give preferential treatment in the college
admissions process to students in the top x percent of their high school class (MarinDaugherty et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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economic stratification across high schools, percent plans could help provide students
from underrepresented groups greater access to selective colleges since the admissions
preference is given to the same proportion of students at every high school (Horn and
Flores, 2003). However, percent plans are very controversial, with some critics claiming
that they are inadequate for ensuring diversity and others arguing that they unfairly
disadvantage students from more competitive high schools (Barr, 2005).3 Despite this
controversy, it remains unclear how eligibility for these admissions preferences affects
college outcomes. This partly reflects the fact that eligibility for automatic admission
is not randomly assigned and also because it is difficult to assemble a dataset containing
information on high school students that contains their class rank and is linked to college
outcomes.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effect of eligibility for automatic college
admissions. Specifically, we estimate the effect of being eligible for automatic admis-
sions under the Texas state policy known as the Top Ten Percent (TTP) Plan. In Texas
during our study period, if a student was above the 90th percentile of their high school’s
class rank distribution, they qualified for automatic admission to any Texas public col-
lege or university.4 This makes it possible to use a regression discontinuity design that
identifies the causal effect of eligibility for the admissions preference by comparing the
outcomes of students on either side of the top ten percent class rank cutoff. To carry
out this analysis, we have assembled a dataset of high school records for students from
a large, diverse Texas school district that has the information necessary for calculating
class rank and that is linked to information on college enrollment from the National
Student Clearinghouse (NSC).
Our approach has several important strengths. First, our data are drawn from students
in a large urban school district where the majority of students are black or Hispanic and
that historically has sent few students to the state’s leading universities. Thus this study
sheds light on whether eligibility for automatic college admissions affects college out-
comes for a demographic that the TTP Plan was designed to benefit. Second, the use of
college enrollment data from the National Student Clearinghouse allows us to consider a
wide set of college outcomes. In particular, we can assess what types of institutions are dis-
placed when flagship enrollment increases as a result of being in the TTP. This is also the
first study on the effect of eligibility for automatic admissions examining longer-run col-
lege persistence measures.
Our findings show that eligibility for automatic admissions under the TTP Plan in-
creases the likelihood that students in our sample enroll at a Texas flagship university.
The magnitude of this effect is large; the smallest point estimates imply an increase of
at least 60 percent above the baseline enrollment rate for students who barely miss being
in the top decile. We also find some evidence that barely being in the top ten percent of
one’s class increases the total number of semesters enrolled at a flagship university over
the four years following high school graduation (although by less than would be implied if
the enrollment effect in the fall following high school graduation persisted over the follow-
ing four years). Our results also suggest that this effect on flagship enrollment leads to
substitution away from private or out-of-state colleges rather than from lower-ranked
public institutions.5 In fact, we do not find that eligibility for automatic admissions affects
the “quality” of colleges students attend, as measured by Barron’s rankings and the
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likelihood of attending college or on enrollment at a four-year college.
We find some evidence that these effects vary across student subgroups. We find sta-
tistically significant effects on measures of college choice for underrepresented minor-
ities that are similar in magnitude to those for white and Asian students (the estimates
for whites and Asians, however, are not precisely estimated). However, these effects are
concentrated in schools that have high college-sending rates (relative to other schools
in the district). In high schools that send relatively few students to college, we find little
evidence that the automatic admissions guarantee affects any of the college outcomes
we examine. Overall, our results suggest that in the urban school district we examine,
offering students eligibility for automatic admissions may do little to improve access to
selective colleges, especially among students who attend the most disadvantaged high
schools.
2. Background
2.1 Rationale for percent plans
Selective colleges admit students on the basis of academic achievement, ACT and SAT
scores, and extracurricular activities. Consequently, students who attend low-quality
schools, are financially constrained, and have limited information about how the admis-
sions process works or about financial aid opportunities are at serious disadvantage
with respect to enrolling in selective colleges (Winston and Hill, 2005; Owings et al.,
1995; Pallais and Turner, 2006). In particular, the lack of diversity at selective colleges
and flagship universities has been attributed to the underrepresentation of low-income
and black and Hispanic students (Pallais and Turner, 2006; Bowen and Bok, 1998).
One of the primary ways universities have attempted to increase the diversity of their
student body is through “affirmative action” policies that grant preferences in admis-
sions decisions to members of racial and ethnic minorities (Holzer and Neumark,
2000). However, political and legal pressure has led to rollbacks or bans in affirmative
action, and as shown in Hinrichs (2010), these bans led to reductions in minority en-
rollment in selective colleges.6 Percent plans, including the Texas TTP Plan arose as an
attempt to formulate a policy that would help maintain diversity in competitive public
universities in a way that did not explicitly give admissions preferences based on race
(U.S. Department of Education 2003). The idea behind these plans is that the top stu-
dents in schools with high concentrations of low-income and underrepresented minor-
ity students would be eligible for admissions preferences even if their other credentials
(e.g., SAT scores) were lower than those of students in more competitive high schools
who did not qualify for the admissions preference. Thus, the extent to which percent
plans would increase diversity in selective public universities depends on there being
considerable segregation across high schools by race and socioeconomic status (Horn
and Flores, 2003).
2.2 Prior research and contributions of this study
Much of the research on the TTP centers on how it compares to race-based affirmative
action in creating diverse college campuses. Long (2004a, b) argues that there are too
few minority students who would qualify for automatic admissions for the policy to off-
set the reductions in minority enrollment that result from banning affirmative action.
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Texas – Austin under the TTP Plan are largely driven by an increase in the enrollment
rates of Asian students, while enrollment rates of blacks and Hispanics declined.
There are a number of explanations for why the TTP Plan may have smaller effects
than affirmative action on the enrollment of black and Hispanic students. Niu et al.
(2006a) find that black and Hispanic students are less likely to be ranked in the TTP,
particularly in schools with high minority populations. Even among students in the top
decile, minorities and graduates from schools serving a large share of low-income stu-
dents are less likely to choose selective institutions as their most preferred school Niu
et al. (2006b). In addition, there are students who may be uninformed of the policy. In
a recent survey of Texas seniors, Hispanic students were significantly less likely to re-
port that they know “a lot” about the TTP Plan, a pattern that holds even among TTP
students with a preference to attend a four-year university (Niu et al., 2006a). Financial
constraints are also likely to play a role, though there are no studies to date that look at
the potential that unmet financial need is deterring TTP students from enrolling at the
Texas flagships7.
While a number of studies have examined the effects of the TTP Plan on overall en-
rollment rates, solid empirical evidence on how automatic admissions affect individual
enrollment decisions remains limited. This is likely due to the lack of student-level data
with the necessary class rank information needed to conduct such an analysis. One ex-
ception is a study by Niu and Tienda (2010) that uses survey data on a sample of high
school graduates that includes administrative data on class rank at graduation. Overall,
they do not find statistically significant estimates of effects on flagship enrollment,
although they do find positive effects for Hispanics and those attending “typical” high
schools. Fletcher and Mayer (2013) find some evidence of an increase in applications
and enrollment resulting from being in the TTP. However, their sample is restricted
to high school students that apply to Texas flagships, making their findings difficult
to interpret.
Our paper builds on prior research in several ways. Most importantly, since our data
cover a broad range of public and private institutions both inside and outside of Texas,
we can examine what types of institutions are displaced by increased flagship enroll-
ment. We can also examine whether there are effects on longer-run measures of college
persistence. Second, we have information on all high school graduates from the study
district, not just applicants or matriculants. This allows us to quantify the effect of eligi-
bility for automatic admission on college outcomes and to do so for key student sub-
groups (e.g., college-sending rate of the student’s high school). Finally, while our data
are not representative of the entire state of Texas, we have large samples for a key
population of interest – students in a large, diverse urban school district with tradition-
ally low college enrollment and a large number of low-income and minority students.
3. Institutional details
The Texas Top Ten Percent Plan was instituted in 1997 in response to Hopwood v.
Texas, a case that banned the use affirmative action in college application decisions.
Rather than using explicit race-based considerations in application decisions, the TTP
Plan states that students who are ranked in the top ten percent of their class must be
granted automatic admission to the public Texas college of their choice. The state
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ever, to receive automatic admission, students must provide a transcript along with
their application that verifies their class rank falls within the TTP. Students must also
take either the SAT or the ACT, although for students in the TTP of their high school
class, these tests are not used for admissions decisions.
For students who are not in the TTP of their high school class, admissions decisions
are based on standard criteria including GPA and class rank, admissions test scores,
and non-academic factors such as socioeconomic status, personal statements, and ex-
tracurricular activities.8 Following the Grutter v. Bollinger decision in 2003, the Univer-
sity of Texas at Austin (but not Texas A&M) reinstated race-conscious affirmative
action. The aggressiveness of the new affirmative action policy, however, is unclear.
There is evidence indicating that the Texas flagships did provide racial minorities pref-
erential treatment in admissions decisions prior to the Hopwood decision and that this
ended after the ban on affirmative action went into place (Long and Tienda, 2008).
However, we are unaware of any research that examines the extent to which racial pref-
erences are used in the post-Grutter context. Nonetheless, since the University of Texas
at Austin uses affirmative action, in subgroup analyses we report estimates by race.
A key consideration for our study is how class rank is defined for the purposes of de-
termining eligibility for automatic admissions. The way in which class rank is calculated
could vary across schools as state law does not specify how this is to be done. More-
over, both absolute class rank and the number of students used to determine percentile
class rank are not constant over time. The relevant class rank for determining eligibility
for automatic admissions is the one used at the time of application to college, which
might vary across students.
To better understand the process by which the relevant class rank for determining
automatic admissions was calculated, we contacted counselors at each of the high
schools in the district we examine as well as a representative from the district’s
central office. Under the student information system used in the district during
our study period, class ranks were calculated centrally. Both class rank and the total
number of students enrolled were calculated at the end of each semester and given to
the student records office, which then distributed transcripts to high school campuses.9
However, this information is not stored by the district as part of its regular data system,
and we instead calculate class rank based on course-level grade records (see Section 5
below for details).
A related issue is that both absolute class rank and the number of students used to
determine percentile class rank are not constant over time. The relevant class rank for
determining eligibility for automatic admissions is the one used at the time of application
to college, which might vary across students. Although students can choose when to apply
to college, the applications to the University of Texas system are due December 1st, and
applications to TAMU are due in the middle of January. At the same time, first semester
high school grades are not released in the district until late January or early February. With
senior grades not available in time for application to flagship colleges, most students will
be accepted to colleges under the TTP Plan according to GPA and class rank measured at
the end of 11th grade. We confirmed with high school counselors in the district that 11th
grade class rank was most likely to be reported on applications to four-year universities,
especially for the flagships which have relatively early application deadlines.
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In the college enrollment process, three distinct decisions take place: students deter-
mine which colleges they will apply to, colleges determine which students they will
accept among the pool of applicants, and students must determine which college to en-
roll in (if any) among colleges that accept them. Automatic admissions policies could
potentially affect enrollment and college choice through any of these processes (Card
and Krueger, 2005).
If all students at the TTP cutoff would likely be admitted even without the TTP Plan,
and if acceptance rates for students just outside of the TTP are also high, then auto-
matic admissions might have minimal effects on student outcomes. In fact, some re-
search suggests that this may have been the case prior to the adoption of the TTP Plan
(Walker and Lavergne, 2001). However, this reasoning fails to account for the increase
in applications to the flagship universities since the TTP Plan went into effect. Today,
the percentage of acceptances to UT and TAMU accounted for by TTP students in-
creased from 36 percent to 61 percent, and the recent efforts of UT to cap the percent-
age of enrollees who are accepted under the TTP Plan provides further evidence that
Texas flagships would be unlikely to accept all top decile applicants in the absence of
the policy. Moreover, some research shows that the TTP Plan expanded the set of high
schools that have students that apply to the flagship universities (Long et al. 2010). If
students from these schools have lower college entrance exam scores (and other cre-
dentials) than did the typical pre-TTP Plan applicant, the admissions patterns from the
period before the adoption of the TTP Plan might not reflect the importance of auto-
matic admissions to current applicants. This is especially important for our study dis-
trict, which has much lower college-sending rates than is typical in Texas.
Eligibility for automatic admissions could also increase the likelihood of applying to a
particular school. A number of studies find that as race-based affirmative action policies
were eliminated, the decrease in probability of acceptance for minority students led to
lower application rates to competitive colleges (Long, 2004b; Brown and Hirschman,
2006), even though highly qualified minority applicants were less affected (Antonovics
and Backes, 2013). By increasing the probability of acceptance to 100 percent for students
who are ranked in the top of their class, automatic admission policies should increase
the number of applications from TTP students. Even if being in the TTP does not ac-
tually increase the probability of acceptance conditional on applying, the TTP Plan
makes the admissions guarantee explicit, and this alone could change application be-
havior if students were not aware that they had a very high probability of being ac-
cepted without the highly visible TTP Plan.
In addition to considering the ways in which automatic admission could affect enroll-
ment and college choice, it is also important to think of how these effects could vary
across student subgroups. One of the primary purposes of the TTP Plan was to ensure
diversity at college campuses, particularly in Texas flagships where black and Hispanic
students have historically been underrepresented and that accept students from a rela-
tively small number of high schools throughout Texas (Barr, 2005). Ex ante, though, it is
not clear whether effects of automatic admissions would be larger or smaller for students
from more disadvantaged backgrounds. On one hand, minority students in the district
tend to be concentrated in the high schools that have lower college-sending rates and
lower academic achievement in general. Since these students may have difficulty being
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might be larger for them. On the other hand, factors such as credit constraints and lack of
information could mitigate the effects of automatic admission for minority students and
students from schools with lower college-sending rates. These considerations motivate
our analysis of the effects by race and also by whether a student attends a high school that
traditionally sends few students to college.
5. Data and descriptive statistics
5.1 Data
This paper uses data from a large urban school district in Texas. We focus on gradu-
ates from the 2002 through 2008 graduating cohorts. Data files include administrative
data on student demographics and high school membership, semester course files with
grades, high school exit exam scores, and graduation information. Full student-level
data are available beginning in 1999, allowing us to follow all students in our sample
throughout high school. District files are supplemented with college data from the
National Student Clearinghouse (NSC), a non-profit organization that is now the na-
tion’s leading source for postsecondary degree and enrollment verification. District
student records are matched to NSC data via students’ social security numbers.
Our data do not include a class rank measure, and we construct it from the district
student-level data. As noted above, during our study period the class rank included on
a student’s transcript is calculated centrally by the district, and we follow the procedure
used by the district to determine the absolute and percentile rank. First, we compute
cumulative GPA at a given time using grades received in courses taken up to that point.
These data come from course enrollment files that include course numbers and titles
for each course in which a student is enrolled, the grade earned, and course entry and
withdrawal dates (where applicable).10 Second, students are ranked within a school on
the basis of cumulative GPA to determine absolute class rank at a particular time.
Finally, the percentile class rank is calculated as the ratio of absolute class rank to the
number of students in a school with a valid cumulative GPA. As described above, the
class rank relevant for automatic admissions to UT-Austin and Texas A&M is the rank
at the end of 11th grade. Therefore, we use this measure in our analysis.
NSC data includes semester-level observations for each NSC-reporting institution that
a student attends, including date of enrollment and completion and level of enrollment
(e.g. part-time, full-time). More than 92 percent of higher education institutions in the
United States report to the NSC. We construct several outcomes using the NSC data. The
NSC data are supplemented with data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data
System (IPEDS) that contains other information on the intuitions students attend. We
also use information on public or private funding structure and state in which the
college is located to determine whether students go to college in- or out-of-state as
well as whether they attend a public or private institution.
We also use the IPEDS data to construct measures related to college “quality” and
cost. The first quality measure is the Barron’s ranking of how competitive admission is
at a particular college. We focus on using this information to classify whether or not a
school is ranked by Barron’s as either a “highly” or “most” competitive institution.11
The second is the selectivity defined as the fraction of applicants who are admitted.
Because these variables reflect the characteristics of applicants and students enrolled
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school is rather than as a proxy for some output-based measure of effectiveness. However,
the admission rate closely corresponds to what “selectivity” is commonly understood to
mean, as are the Barron’s rankings (Hoxby, 2001). This notion of “quality” also corre-
sponds with what is meant in public discussions about access to “elite” universities. For
cost, we use the tuition “sticker price” students face at a particular institution (for which
we use the 2009 tuition as listed in IPEDS). It is important to recognize that this is a lim-
ited proxy for the actual tuition students will have to pay since many of the students in
our sample come from fairly disadvantaged backgrounds and would qualify for substantial
amounts of financial aid. Nonetheless, because selective institutions generally charge a
higher “sticker price”, tuition is useful for characterizing the type of institutions students
attend. Moreover, other studies examining college choice have found that tuition influ-
ences the college students attend (Long 2004a; Jacob et al. 2013).
Using the information from NSC and IPEDS, we first look at short-run measures of
college enrollment and choice. These measures are based on the schools in which stu-
dents enroll in the fall following graduation. Next, we look at persistence measures in-
cluding year-by-year enrollment up to four years after high school graduation, total
semesters enrolled in college four years after graduation, and transferring to a more (or
less) selective college.
The sample used in the analysis consists of students who graduated from a district
high school between 2002 and 2008. We limit the analysis to graduates because the dis-
trict only obtained college enrollment data from NSC for high school graduates. One
concern with doing so is that it might impart selection bias if TTP status at the end of
11th grade affects the probability of graduation. However as we discuss below, there is
no evidence for this type of effect. We also exclude students who did not have valid
GPA’s at the end of 11th grade (for instance, students who transfer into the district in
12th grade) since our empirical strategy relies on using 11th grade percentile class rank
as the running variable in the regression discontinuity estimation. Our final sample
includes 17,057 students across the 7 cohorts.
5.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our analysis sample by TTP status. We also
show results for students close to the TTP cutoff (i.e., above the 80th percentile) and
stratified by whether a student attended a high school that sent a relatively high frac-
tion of its graduates to college (we define a high college-sending high school as one
where at least 25 percent of the graduates enroll in college in the fall following
graduation). The results indicate that TTP students are more likely to be white and
female and are less likely to be economically disadvantaged. As expected, TTP stu-
dents are higher performing across all measures of academic achievement. Students
in the TTP are more likely to graduate with a recommended or distinguished dip-
loma, take a college entrance exam, and have much higher exit exam scores. These
patterns are found in both types of high schools, although higher college-sending
schools serve students from higher socioeconomic backgrounds and have much better
academic achievement.
TTP students have substantially higher college-going rates than students outside the
TTP. Overall, almost 60 percent of students in the TTP attend college in the fall
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
RD sample: class rank +/- 10 percentage points of top 10%

















Male 0.48 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.28 0.36
White 0.27 0.40 0.43 0.37 0.60 0.53 0.16 0.11
Black 0.29 0.20 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.12 0.16
Hispanic 0.41 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.09 0.14 0.65 0.70
Econ. Disadvantaged 0.54 0.45 0.41 0.48 0.20 0.29 0.74 0.79
Limited Eng. Proficiency 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.18
Special Education 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04
Nbhd HH Inc: Bottom Quartile 0.40 0.30 0.27 0.32 0.17 0.24 0.45 0.45
Nbhd HH Inc: Second Quartile 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.30 0.16 0.22 0.37 0.42
Nbhd HH Inc: Third Quartile 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.31 0.27 0.15 0.12
Nbhd HH Inc: Top Quartile 0.12 0.20 0.23 0.16 0.36 0.26 0.03 0.01
High School Record
10th Grade GPA 2.96 3.91 4.16 3.65 4.26 3.75 4.00 3.49
11th Grade GPA 2.95 3.92 4.18 3.66 4.28 3.76 4.01 3.48
GPA at Graduation 2.99 3.92 4.17 3.66 4.29 3.78 3.99 3.47
Recommended Diploma 0.67 0.82 0.76 0.88 0.67 0.86 0.90 0.91
Distinguished Diploma 0.04 0.14 0.22 0.06 0.31 0.09 0.08 0.01
Math exit exam z-score 0.23 0.83 1.01 0.65 1.08 0.80 0.90 0.43
Reading exit exam z-score 0.22 0.67 0.78 0.57 0.82 0.66 0.73 0.41
Took SAT or ACT 0.31 0.50 0.55 0.45 0.58 0.52 0.50 0.35
College Outcomes
(Year following Graduation)
Enrolled in College 0.30 0.51 0.58 0.44 0.68 0.56 0.40 0.26
Enrolled in 4 Yr. College 0.20 0.45 0.54 0.36 0.66 0.48 0.33 0.16
Enrolled Private School 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.05
Enrolled Out of State 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.03 0.02
Enrolled Most/Highly
Competitive
0.08 0.27 0.37 0.16 0.47 0.23 0.21 0.04
Enrolled at UT Austin 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.00
Enrolled at Texas A&M 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.00
Enrolled at a Flagship 0.04 0.14 0.21 0.07 0.28 0.11 0.10 0.01
Admission rate
(not enrolled=100%)
0.93 0.83 0.78 0.88 0.73 0.84 0.88 0.95
Admission rate
(drop not enrolled)
0.76 0.67 0.63 0.73 0.60 0.71 0.69 0.81
College Persistence
(within 4 years)
Total Semesters at Flagship 0.28 1.00 1.52 0.49 2.07 0.77 0.62 0.05
Total Semesters at 4yr. 1.39 3.28 4.03 2.52 4.97 3.53 2.50 0.93
Sample Size 17,085 4,196 2,105 2,091 1,304 1,281 801 810
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all students in the bottom 90 percent). These differences are especially stark for flagship
university enrollment, with 21 percent of TTP students attending a flagship (or about
one-in-three students who enroll in college) compared to only 7 percent for those in
the 80th to 90th percentiles. However, sizable differences also exist for enrollment at pri-
vate and out-of-state institutions, which suggests that the causal effect of being in the
TTP on flagship enrollment is at most only a portion of the raw difference in flagship
enrollment for TTP and non-TTP students.
Two other patterns bear mentioning. First, only 10 percent of TTP students in the
lower-sending high schools enroll in a flagship, compared to almost 30 percent in the
higher-sending schools. This difference motivates our examination of heterogeneity in
the effects of being in the TTP between these types of high schools. Second, college-
sending rates overall in the district are low. Statewide, during our study period, the per-
cent of high school graduates enrolled in college in the fall following graduation ranged
from 52 to 56 percent (THECB, 2010), but only 30 percent of graduates in this district
enrolled in college. Even in the high schools that send large numbers of students to col-
lege relative to the district overall, only 37 percent of graduates enroll in college (the
fraction who attend college in the top 20 percent in these schools, i.e., what is reported
in columns 5 and 6 of Table 1, is much higher).
Third, the fraction of students in the top ten percent in our sample (2,105/17,085 =
0.12) is greater than ten percent. This is because, as described above, we use class rank
at the end of 11th grade in our analysis and to determine top ten percent status, but
our sample consists of high school graduates. Since students drop out between the end
of 11th grade and graduation, and dropouts are much more likely for students with low
GPA’s, percentile class rank tends to worsen over this period. This has two important
implications. First, more than ten percent of graduates will be eligible for automatic ad-
missions since the end of 11th grade GPA is the final GPA determined before applica-
tions are due to the flagship universities. Second, there are likely to be discrepancies
between class rank at graduation and at 11th grade.12 As described in the next section,
measurement error in the class rank measure could bias the estimates, and this is likely
to be worse when using class rank at graduation as the running variable in the RD ana-
lysis since class rank at graduation is determined after college application and admis-
sions decisions are made.13
6. Methods
6.1 Research design and estimation
The goal of this paper is to estimate the effect of being eligible for automatic admission
to the Texas public universities via membership in the top decile of one’s high school
class. The empirical challenge we face stems from the differences between TTP
students and those with lower class rank, some of which are documented in Table 1.
To credibly estimate the effect of being in the TTP, we use an approach that mimics
randomly assigning placement into the TTP. Specifically, we employ a regression dis-
continuity research design that relies on comparisons between students whose class
rank is just above or below the cutoff used for eligibility for automatic admissions.
As demonstrated by Lee (2008), as long as students cannot exert complete control
over their exact class rank (i.e., there is some randomness in class rank at the point
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class rank threshold is “as good as” random, and students on either side of the
threshold should be similar in all respects other than one being in the top decile and
the other not.
To formalize these ideas consider the following model for some outcome, Yi (e.g., en-
rollment in a Texas flagship university):
Yi ¼ θTTPi þ f CRið Þ þ Xiβþ ei ð1Þ
Where CRi is the ranking of student i in her high school class (measured as the frac-
tion of students with a higher GPA than student i), TTPi is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if a student is in the TTP of her class (i.e., Ti = 1(CRi < .10)), Xi is a vector of ob-
servable covariates, and ei is a random disturbance term. The function f(·) is function
of class rank that captures the relationship between the outcome and class rank away
from the TTP cutoff.
The key assumption underlying our approach is that falling just above or below the
ten percent cutoff is not systematically related to other factors that affect the outcomes
of interest (i.e., ei). The primary threat to the research design is that students manipu-
late their class rank in order to just get above the ten percent cutoff.14 While students
may alter the mix of courses they take and petition for better grades in order to in-
crease their chances of being in the top decile of their class, course performance is at
least somewhat uncertain and students are unlikely to have perfect information about
exactly what their classmate’s GPA will be. This makes it unlikely that students can ma-
nipulate their exact class rank with the precision necessary to undermine our empirical
strategy.
In addition to being credible on a priori grounds, the assumptions underlying the re-
search design can be tested by examining baseline covariates and examining whether
they “trend smoothly” through the ten percent cutoff (Lee, 2008; Imbens and Lemieux,
2008) and whether the distribution of class rank is discontinuous at the ten percent
cutoff. Below we show evidence consistent with the identification assumptions we
make. We also report results from specifications that include controls for baseline
covariates, which should improve the precision of the estimates and have little effect on
the point estimates if the controls are “balanced” on either side of the cutoff.
Obtaining consistent estimates of the discontinuity in a given outcome depends
crucially on modeling f(·) in Equation 1 appropriately. We follow the suggestion of
Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009) and use local
linear regression in a bandwidth around the TTP cutoff, where the slopes are allowed
to differ for students below and above the 90th percentile cutoff.15 To assess the sen-
sitivity of bandwidth choice, we report estimates from three different specifications.
The first two are OLS local linear regression models with a bandwidth of either 10 or
5 percentile ranking points. To further assess which specification is most trustworthy
for a given outcome, we also present graphical evidence showing the regression fit
and local means. The degree to which the regression fit “tracks” the local means near
the cut point is informative about whether the estimated discontinuity is being driven
by misspecification of f(·). If the regression fit tracks the underlying data well, then it
provides reassurance that the estimated discontinuities are reliable. As a final check
Daugherty et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 12 of 292014, 3:10
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/10on the robustness of the results, we also use as a third specification the estimator pro-
posed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009; henceforth IK) that uses weighted local
linear regression and a data-driven bandwidth choice.
6.2 Interpretation
Our approach is designed to produce internally valid estimates of the effect of being in the
top ten percent of one’s class. As noted above, any effects could be operating by changing
the likelihood of applying to a particular university, the probability of acceptance condi-
tional on application, or the probability of enrollment conditional on acceptance. We are
not able to distinguish from among these mechanisms since we only observe enrollment
outcomes and not application or admissions decisions. Thus, our estimates should be
thought as the reduced-form effect of barely being in the TTP at a time when state law
guaranteed automatic admission for students in the top decile of their high school class.
While eligibility for automatic admission to the Texas public universities is the most
noteworthy consequence of being in the TTP, as described above, the policy in place in
Texas during this time included outreach efforts that targeted students in the TTP,
especially at schools that serve large numbers of disadvantaged students and where
students are eligible to apply for Longhorn or Century scholarships. This outreach may
have had independent effects on college enrollment by, for instance, increasing infor-
mation about college. As such, our results should be interpreted as estimates of the
combined effect of automatic admission and the accompanying outreach efforts that
are part of the Texas TTP Plan16.
In addition, as with any regression discontinuity design, our estimates are “local” to
the cutoff; specifically, they capture a weighted average of individual-level effects where
the weights are a function of the probability of being at the ten percent cutoff (Lee,
2008). In this case, the effect near the cutoff has considerable policy relevance. This is
because the controversy surrounding the TTP Plan largely stems from the perception
that the law lets “under-qualified” students gain admission to the most selective univer-
sities, and our estimates shed light on the students for whom this claim is most rele-
vant. Moreover, our results are informative about the likely consequences of a change
in the automatic admissions cutoff, such as that which went into effect at UT Austin in
the fall of 2011.
7. Results
7.1 Tests of the identification assumptions
As described in the preceding section, the assumptions underlying our research design
can be tested by examining whether baseline covariates exhibit discontinuous changes
at the ten percent cutoff. Table 2 demonstrates that discontinuity estimates for the
baseline covariates are generally small in magnitude, and there are no covariates for
which we found statistically significant discontinuities across all bandwidth specifications.
As a summary measure of all of the covariates, we predicted the probability of 4-year
college enrollment as a function of baseline covariates, which places most weight on
covariates which are relevant predictors of college enrollment. As seen in Figure 1,
there is no evidence that this measure jumps discontinuously at the TTP cutoff.
A second test of the identification assumption is to examine whether the distribution
of class rank is continuous at the cut point (McCrary, 2008). Because we restrict the
Table 2 Discontinuities in baseline covariates
E(Enroll 4Yr College | X) 0.001 0.010 0.015
(0.011) (0.015) (0.028)
Male -0.028 0.025 0.020
(0.030) (0.041) (0.062)
Economically Disadvantaged -0.011 0.020 -0.059
(0.031) (0.043) (0.065)
African American 0.013 0.026 -0.049
(0.025) (0.036) (0.067)
White 0.003 0.003 0.067
(0.030) (0.042) (0.063)
Other Ethnicity -0.007 0.023 -0.061
(0.027) (0.039) (0.072)
Limited English Proficiency 0.021 -0.007 -0.003
(0.018) (0.025) (0.041)
Special Education 0.002 0.005 -0.001
(0.008) (0.011) (0.015)
Reading Exit Exam Z-score -0.078* -0.026 -0.016
(0.038) (0.055) (0.082)
Math Exit Exam Z-score -0.038 0.041 0.032
(0.043) (0.060) (0.086)
Missing Math Exit Exam 0.019 0.016 0.024
(0.018) (0.025) (0.039)
Missing Reading Exit Exam 0.015 -0.000 0.019
(0.018) (0.025) (0.039)
Graduation cohort -0.062 -0.035 -0.016
(0.106) (0.149) (0.188)
GPA middle grade 11 -0.047* -0.001 0.011
(0.019) (0.028) (0.044)
GPA end of grade 10 -0.032 0.002 0.017
(0.020) (0.029) (0.046)
HH Income Quartile of Census Blk Group
Bottom Quartile 0.018 0.017 -0.109
(0.029) (0.041) (0.071)
Second Quartile -0.025 -0.019 0.059
(0.027) (0.038) (0.061)
Third Quartile -0.032 -0.058 -0.057
(0.026) (0.037) (0.059)
Top Quartile 0.042 0.067* 0.118*
(0.024) (0.033) (0.051)
Bandwidth 10 5 IK opt bw
Note: Estimates are estimated discontinuities for a covariate at the TTP cutoff. Columns 1 and 2 use local linear
regression with slopes varying on either side of TTP cutoff and with bandwidths of 10 and 5 percentage points,
respectively; robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 3 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman procedure for point
estimates and standard errors. N for bw=10 is 4,196 and for bw=5 is 2107 (N varies by covariate in column 3). *denote
statistically significant estimate at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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Figure 1 Probability of 4-year college enrollment predicted using baseline covariates by end of 11th
grade class rank.
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not uniformly distributed. In particular, if end of 11th grade TTP status affects the like-
lihood of high school graduation, then the distribution of class rank will be discontinu-
ous at the TTP cutoff. As noted earlier, this type of sorting into the TTP at the cutoff
could impart selection bias. Fortunately, the evidence in Figure 2 reveals no indication
of any such manipulation, nor does the estimate from the “McCrary test” (McCrary,
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Figure 2 Distribution of class rank at end of 11th grade, 2002-2007 high school graduates.
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Table 3 presents the estimates of the effect of being in the TTP on college enrollment
and college choice outcomes. As mentioned previously, all of these outcomes refer to
enrollment in the fall following graduation from high school. The results indicate that
membership in the TTP does increase flagship enrollment. The estimates range from
about 5 to 7 percentage points in columns 1-4 (local linear regressions with bandwidths
of 5 or 10 percentage points) and 11 to 14 percentage points in the IK specification,
which uses a very narrow bandwidth. These results provide strong evidence that eligibil-
ity for automatic admissions increases the likelihood of flagship university attendance,
although the magnitude of the effect is somewhat sensitive to the model specification.
When examining effects on flagship enrollment separately for the two flagship univer-
sities, we find positive estimates for both Texas A&M and UT-Austin, although these
are not always statistically significant. Graphical evidence consistent with these resultsTable 3 Effect of being in top 10% at end of 11th grade on college enrollment and
choice
Enrolled in Flagship 0.057** 0.053** 0.074* 0.066* 0.136** 0.110**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.029) (0.027) (0.048) (0.042)
Enrolled UT Austin 0.042** 0.040** 0.032 0.027 0.077 0.063
(0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.022) (0.041) (0.039)
Enrolled Texas A&M 0.016 0.014 0.039* 0.037 0.058 0.048
(0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.031) (0.030)
Enrolled Public Non-Flagship -0.016 -0.010 -0.017 -0.013 -0.097 -0.089
(0.023) (0.023) (0.033) (0.032) (0.056) (0.049)
Enrolled Private or Out-of-State -0.081** -0.079** -0.028 -0.030 -0.075 -0.076
(0.024) (0.023) (0.033) (0.031) (0.055) (0.050)
Enrolled Out-of-State -0.012 -0.013 0.005 0.005 0.013 0.010
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.036) (0.034)
Enrolled Private -0.069** -0.066** -0.033 -0.035 -0.090 -0.085
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.052) (0.049)
Enrolled 4 Year -0.041 -0.036 0.017 0.010 -0.050 -0.064
(0.030) (0.027) (0.043) (0.038) (0.067) (0.054)
Enrolled any College -0.040 -0.036 0.029 0.022 -0.023 -0.042
(0.031) (0.028) (0.044) (0.039) (0.070) (0.059)
Enrolled Highly or
Most Competitive College
-0.009 -0.010 0.055 0.043 0.065 0.035
(0.027) (0.024) (0.038) (0.033) (0.060) (0.049)
Selectivity (% Admitted) 0.015 0.014 -0.016 -0.013 -0.000 0.003
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.029) (0.024)
Tuition (Sticker Price),
zero if not enrolled
-1751.048** -1650.040** -243.655 -329.141 -589.470 -632.018
(575.676) (524.495) (792.473) (720.169) (788.656) (692.873)
Bandwidth 10 10 5 5 IK opt bw IK opt bw
Baseline covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Outcomes refer to enrollment and choice in the semester following high school graduation. Columns 1 and 2 use
local linear regression with bandwidths of 10 and 5 percentage points, respectively; robust standard errors in
parentheses. Column 3 uses the Imbens and Kalyanaraman procedure for point estimates and standard errors. N for
bw=10 is 4,196 and for bw=5 is 2107 (N varies by covariate in column 3). **, * denote statistically significant estimate at
the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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and local linear regression fits (separately for bandwidths of 5 and 10 percentage
points). The results for flagship attendance (upper-left panel) clearly show that the like-
lihood of attending a flagship drops when class rank falls above the ten percent cutoff.
Three other points about the flagship enrollment results are noteworthy. First, the es-
timates are not very sensitive to the inclusion of baseline covariates, which is consistent
with the baseline covariates being balanced on either side of the TTP cutoff. Second,
the fact that we find a discontinuity in flagship enrollment suggests that measurement
error in our class rank measure might be minimal. This is because even small amounts
of error in either the GPA calculation or the count of students included in the denom-
inator could wipe out any discontinuity that exists at the actual TTP cutoff when using
the noisy class rank measure (Pei, 2011).17 Third, the effects are large in magnitude.
Only about 9 percent of students who barely miss being in the TTP enroll in a flagship,
so even the smallest point estimates imply being in the TTP increases the likelihood of
flagship enrollment by almost 60 percent.
A key question is whether this effect on TTP enrollment reflects an overall increase
in the likelihood of enrolling in college. The estimates in Table 3 offer little indication
that this is the case. Across all specifications, the largest point estimate of the effect of
being in the TTP on enrollment in a four-year institution is 2 percentage points. In the
specification with the most precise estimates (bandwidth of 10 controlling for baseline
covariates), we can rule out effects larger than about 2 percentage points. These esti-
mates are consistent with the lack of a discontinuity in the probability of 4-year college
enrollment at the TTP cutoff as seen in the lower-right panel of Figure 3. We find very
similar results when examining the effect of enrolling in any college, which includes en-
rollment at two-year community colleges.
A positive effect on flagship enrollment but no effect on overall college enrollment
implies that the increase in flagship enrollment must be displacing enrollment at some
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Figure 3 Flagship and 4-year college enrollment by end of 11th grade class rank.
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barely missed it. We find little evidence of this type of displacement, as we see no discon-
tinuity in the probability of attending a public non-flagship institution at the TTP cutoff.
The estimates in Table 3 from the models with a bandwidth of 10 and 5 are very close to
zero. The estimates from the IK estimator are negative and larger in magnitude, but
imprecisely estimated due to the very narrow bandwidth (1.96 percentage points). We
also do not find evidence that TTP affects enrollment in any college, suggesting that it
does not increase community college enrollment either, but this is to be expected since
these schools admit anyone with a high school degree.
We do find some evidence that being in the TTP displaces enrollment at private or
out-of-state colleges. The upper-right panel of Figure 3 shows that enrollment in these
institutions trends downward with class rank but that it appears to jump up at the TTP
cutoff. The estimates in Table 3 with the bandwidth of 10 and the IK specification are
negative and about 7-8 percentage points as well as statistically significant with the
wider bandwidth. The estimates for the bandwidth of 5 are also negative but smaller in
magnitude and not statistically significant. When examining enrollment in private and
out-of-state enrollment separately, the estimates in Table 3 suggest that any displace-
ment seems to be operating through a reduction in enrollment in private institutions
rather than out-of-state institutions since the estimates for out-of-state enrollment are
small and not statistically significant.
Next, we examined whether TTP status affects measures of college “quality”. This is
important, because eligibility for automatic admissions is designed to help improve ac-
cess to elite universities by guaranteeing access to the state’s flagship institutions. On
the other hand, much of the opposition to the TTP Plan centers on the claim that stu-
dents admitted the TTP Plan’s automatic admissions guarantee will take spots from
better-qualified students who are not admitted under the TTP Plan because they attend
more competitive high schools. To examine this issue, we first estimate the effect of
eligibility for automatic admission on the probability of enrolling in a college ranked
by Barron’s as either a “highly” or “most” competitive institution. The point estimates
in Table 3 are not statistically significant, but the magnitudes are sensitive to the
choice of bandwidth. With a bandwidth of 10, the estimates are very close to zero and
statistically insignificant. The estimates with narrower bandwidths are positive and lar-
ger in magnitude but are too imprecisely estimated to be statistically significant. This
is consistent with the graphical evidence in the lower-left panel of Figure 4, where
there is not clear evidence of a sharp change in this outcome at the TTP cutoff. Next,
we use a continuous measure of selectivity defined as the fraction of applicants to a
college who were admitted (so that a lower value of the measure indicates a more se-
lective institution).18 The lower-right panel of Figure 4 shows that selectivity is
strongly related to class rank but that there is no discontinuous change in average col-
lege selectivity at the TTP cutoff. Similarly, the point estimates in Table 3 are small in
magnitude and statistically insignificant.
Taken together, the above results provide very little indication automatic eligibility
for admission under the TTP Plan affects the “quality” of institutions students attend.
However, since it appears that automatic admissions increases flagship enrollment at
the expense of private university attendance, it may be that students attend more expen-
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Figure 4 Non-flagship enrollment and college quality by end of 11th grade class rank.
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overstate the actual tuition faced by many students in our sample, but it still is useful for
characterizing the type of institution students attend, and also because it has been shown
to be correlated with college choice (Long 2004a; Jacob et al., 2013). The estimates in
Table 3 offer some evidence that barely being in the TTP leads to attending a college with
lower sticker price tuition, but the estimate is only statistically significant with the band-
width of 10. The estimates for narrower bandwidths are smaller and not statistically
significant.
7.3 Effects on college persistence
We now turn to outcomes that characterize student persistence in college. Figure 5
shows flagship enrollment by class rank in years 2-4 following high school graduation
as well as total semesters spent in a flagship 4 years after graduation. For enrollment in
years 2-4, it appears flagship enrollment is higher just to the left of the TTP cutoff, al-
though the magnitude of any discontinuity is smaller than it is for year 1 enrollment
(Figure 3). This is confirmed in Table 4, where the point estimates are smaller in mag-
nitude than they are for year 1 flagship enrollment and not statistically significant. The
average of total semesters spent in a flagship does appear to change discontinuously at
the TTP cutoff. The estimates in Table 4 are positive and statistically significant with
the bandwidth in the IK specification (and 3 out of the 4 other estimates are also statis-
tically significant at the 10 percent level). The magnitude of the estimates is about 4 to
5 times larger than the effect on year 1 flagship enrollment in Table 3. This is consist-
ent with the effects of being in the TTP on flagship enrollment in subsequent years be-
ing positive but fading out relative to the effect in year 1. In contrast if the year 1
enrollment effect were persistent throughout the following four years, the effect on
total semesters at a flagship would be 8 times as large as the year 1 enrollment effect.
Figure 6 shows results for enrollment in private or out-of-state schools. For year-by-
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Figure 5 Flagship enrollment through year 4 after HS graduation by end of 11th grade class rank.
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state colleges. The point estimates in Table 4 for a bandwidth of 10 are negative and
statistically significant for year 2 enrollment and total semesters (the estimates for year
3 and 4 enrollment are at the margin for statistical significance), and the estimates for
the IK specification are similar in magnitude but less precisely estimated. However, the
estimates from the model with a bandwidth of 5 are smaller in magnitude and not sta-
tistically significant, although they are still negative. Overall, these results suggest that
being in the TTP may lead to persistent displacement of private or out-of-state enroll-
ment, although the estimates are somewhat sensitive to the regression specification.
Figure 7 shows similar graphs for enrollment in any 4-year college. The visual evidence
does not suggest that there is any effect of being in the TTP on either year-by-year
enrollment nor on total semesters enrolled in college. The point estimates in Table 4
again exhibit sensitivity to the specification but are never statistically significant and
are not consistently positive or negative.
Given that we find that the effect on flagship enrollment declines over time, an im-
portant question is whether this is being driven by students admitted under the TTP
dropping out at a higher rate than other students. For instance, it may be that students
admitted because of TTP are not able to do well in the rigorous academic environment
of the flagship universities.20 To investigate this possibility, we examined whether being
in the TTP affected the likelihood of transferring to a more (or less) selective institution
(measured by the Barron’s competitive admissions ratings) and the probability of drop-
ping out of college. The evidence in Figure 8 provides no indication of any effects on
these outcomes, which is consistent with the point estimates in Table 4.
7.4 Subgroup analyses
Table 5 shows estimates by subgroups. The first panel shows results stratified by race, with
whites and Asians compared to underrepresented minority students (i.e., Hispanics,
blacks, and Native Americans). The estimated effects on flagship enrollment are more
Table 4 Effect of being in top 10% at end of 11th grade on persistence outcomes
Enrolled Flagship in: Year 2 0.026 0.022 0.031 0.025 0.081 0.057
(0.020) (0.019) (0.028) (0.026) (0.043) (0.038)
Year 3 0.036 0.031 0.039 0.033 0.082 0.060
(0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.025) (0.043) (0.038)
Year 4 0.020 0.015 0.029 0.021 0.074 0.057
(0.019) (0.018) (0.027) (0.025) (0.043) (0.039)
Enrolled Priv/OOS in: Year 2 -0.061** -0.058** -0.032 -0.032 -0.051 -0.051
(0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.030) (0.054) (0.049)
Year 3 -0.043 -0.040 -0.009 -0.008 -0.044 -0.043
(0.023) (0.021) (0.031) (0.030) (0.051) (0.046)
Year 4 -0.044 -0.040 -0.022 -0.022 -0.023 -0.022
(0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.029) (0.051) (0.046)
Enrolled in 4-Yr: Year 2 -0.044 -0.040 -0.008 -0.012 -0.011 -0.029
(0.030) (0.025) (0.042) (0.035) (0.064) (0.052)
Year 3 -0.023 -0.020 0.024 0.021 0.030 0.013
(0.030) (0.026) (0.042) (0.036) (0.063) (0.051)
Year 4 -0.021 -0.017 0.025 0.019 0.069 0.050
(0.030) (0.026) (0.042) (0.036) (0.067) (0.056)
Transfer to More Selective School -0.003 -0.001 -0.032 -0.029 0.006 0.007
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.038) (0.033)
Transfer to Less Selective School 0.006 0.008 0.013 0.010 -0.033 -0.034
(0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.038) (0.037)
Dropped Out (=0 if did not enroll) -0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.049 -0.057
(0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023) (0.038) (0.037)
Total Semesters: Flagship 0.279 0.245 0.349 0.293 0.589* 0.459*
(0.150) (0.141) (0.208) (0.193) (0.261) (0.233)
Total Semester: 4 Year -0.188 -0.161 0.242 0.202 0.229 0.130
(0.209) (0.174) (0.295) (0.240) (0.344) (0.267)
Total Semesters: Highly or Most Competitive -0.104 -0.119 0.249 0.178 0.338 0.217
(0.196) (0.165) (0.276) (0.229) (0.320) (0.259)
Total Semesters: Private or Out-of-State -0.396* -0.376* -0.122 -0.125 -0.211 -0.232
(0.165) (0.155) (0.227) (0.214) (0.303) (0.272)
Bandwidth 10 10 5 5 IK opt bw IK opt bw
Baseline covariates? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: Enrollment outcomes refer to enrollment in the indicated year following high school graduation. Total semesters
enrolled refers to enrollment over the four years following high school graduation. The specifications are the same as in
Table 3. N for bw=10 is 4,197; bw=5 is 2110. Robust standard errors in parentheses. **, * denote statistically significant
estimate at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Daugherty et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 20 of 292014, 3:10
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/10precisely estimated for underrepresented minority students, but the magnitude of the esti-
mates is similar for both groups. This pattern also holds for the other outcomes, although
the negative effect on private or out-of-state enrollment is not robust to changing the
bandwidth for underrepresented minority students.
Next, we examine effects stratified by whether students attend a high school with a
relatively high (for the district) college-sending rate. The results strongly suggest that
the effects of eligibility for automatic admission are concentrated in the higher college-
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Figure 6 Private or out-of-state enrollment through year 4 after HS graduation by end of 11th grade
class rank.
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mesters of flagship enrollment are only statistically significant when the bandwidth is
10, but the point estimates are similar in magnitude for the other specifications. In
contrast, we do not find any evidence of impacts on flagship enrollment for students
from low college-sending high schools, and the estimated effects on total semesters
in a flagship are not statistically significant and change signs across specifications.
Despite the lack of effects on flagship enrollment, we find negative effects on private
or out-of-state enrollment and total semesters in a four-year college. However, these
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Figure 8 Transfer and dropout by end of 11th grade class rank.
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When interpreting these results, it is important to remember that even the higher
college-sending high schools in the district have relatively low college-sending rates
relative to the state as a whole. Nonetheless, these results indicate that eligibility for
automatic admissions may have little effect on college enrollment and choice for the
most disadvantaged urban high schools.
The third panel shows results by socioeconomic status. The estimated effects on flag-
ship enrollment are larger in magnitude for students who are not economically disad-
vantaged and range from 9-13 percentage points. In contrast, they are only statistically
significant for the economically disadvantaged sample in the IK specification. The esti-
mates for total semesters of flagship enrollment also are larger for the not economically
disadvantaged sample, and the estimates for the economically disadvantaged sample are
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. For both groups, we find negative and
statistically significant effects on private or out-of-state enrollment in the bandwidth of
10 specification, and for the non-economically disadvantaged sample the estimate for
the IK specification is even larger in magnitude (although not statistically significant).
Finally, we examined results by gender. The estimated effects on flagship enrollment
are larger for women than they are for men. However, the difference in magnitudes is
not especially large, and the estimated effects on total semesters on flagship enrollment
are larger for men in some specifications than for women. Overall, these results do not
offer clear evidence of differential effects by gender.
8. Discussion and conclusion
Attending a selective college is widely seen as providing students, particularly those
from disadvantaged backgrounds, access to opportunities that are otherwise difficult to
obtain. Consistent with this view, evidence from recent studies suggests that selective
college attendance has sizable returns that are especially large for lower-income and
minority students. Nonetheless, there remain large gaps in selective college attendance
Table 5 Effects of being in top 10% at end of 11th grade by subgroups
Race Whites & Asians Under-represented minorities
Enrolled in Flagship 0.054 0.048 0.113 0.053** 0.085** 0.075**
(0.037) (0.054) (0.084) (0.020) (0.025) (0.027)
Enrolled Private or Out-of-State -0.083* -0.045 -0.135 -0.076** -0.010 0.001
(0.038) (0.054) (0.094) (0.027) (0.038) (0.059)
Total Semesters: Flagship 0.255 0.209 0.560 0.260* 0.429** 0.371*
(0.269) (0.393) (0.439) (0.129) (0.166) (0.156)
Total Semester: 4 Year -0.138 0.157 0.256 -0.209 0.367 0.119
(0.283) (0.414) (0.458) (0.219) (0.286) (0.319)
HS College-Sending Level High college sending Low college sending
Enrolled in Flagship 0.085** 0.095* 0.157* -0.004 0.013 -0.002
(0.030) (0.042) (0.062) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025)
Enrolled Private or Out-of-State -0.065* -0.039 -0.091 -0.099** -0.022 -0.039
(0.032) (0.045) (0.071) (0.028) (0.041) (0.057)
Total Semesters: Flagship 0.423* 0.428 0.589 -0.070 0.047 0.118
(0.216) (0.303) (0.339) (0.118) (0.132) (0.107)
Total Semester: 4 Year 0.058 0.402 0.384 -0.503* -0.085 -0.222
(0.242) (0.344) (0.376) (0.230) (0.300) (0.359)
SES Not econ. Disadvantaged Economically disadvantaged
Enrolled in Flagship 0.089** 0.097* 0.128 0.006 0.025 0.056*
(0.032) (0.046) (0.065) (0.020) (0.024) (0.028)
Enrolled Private or Out-of-State -0.075* -0.031 -0.101 -0.076** -0.026 -0.015
(0.035) (0.048) (0.079) (0.028) (0.040) (0.053)
Total Semesters: Flagship 0.472* 0.428 0.584 -0.041 0.139 0.111
(0.233) (0.329) (0.374) (0.127) (0.144) (0.138)
Total Semester: 4 Year -0.004 0.266 0.127 -0.342 0.195 0.014
(0.256) (0.363) (0.400) (0.233) (0.307) (0.323)
Gender Women Men
Enrolled in Flagship 0.061** 0.083** 0.127** 0.042 0.038 0.107
(0.023) (0.031) (0.044) (0.038) (0.055) (0.073)
Enrolled Private or Out-of-State -0.094** -0.029 -0.085 -0.056 -0.028 -0.163
(0.027) (0.038) (0.056) (0.040) (0.057) (0.091)
Total Semesters: Flagship 0.191 0.287 0.595* 0.393 0.363 0.458
(0.161) (0.217) (0.260) (0.271) (0.389) (0.386)
Total Semester: 4 Year -0.303 0.046 -0.027 0.086 0.559 0.491
(0.215) (0.294) (0.325) (0.299) (0.439) (0.460)
Bandwidth 10 5 IK opt bw 10 5 IK opt bw
Note: See notes to Tables 4 and 5. All estimates are from models that include controls for baseline covariates. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. **, * denote statistically significant estimate at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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therefore an important social and economic issue.
The Texas Top Ten Percent Plan is an example of such a policy. In this paper, we es-
timated the effects of eligibility for the automatic admissions guarantee this policy pro-
vides to students in the top decile of their high school class. We did so using
administrative data from a large urban school district in Texas linked to college
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comes of students who just made the cutoff for the TTP and those who just missed it.
The analysis discussed in this paper generated several notable findings that have im-
portant policy implications. First, our results demonstrate that eligibility for automatic
admissions does appear to increase enrollment at flagship universities for students in
an urban school district that sends relatively few students to college who are at the
margin of being in the top decile of their class. In particular, we also find these effects
for underrepresented minority students. These findings are noteworthy because a key
goal of the TTP Plan, and percent plans in general, is to increase access to the top pub-
lic universities for traditionally under-served populations.
Despite these effects on flagship enrollment, we find little evidence that the automatic
admissions guarantee leads to increases in the “quality” of the colleges students attend.
Instead, the increases in flagship enrollment appear to “crowd out” enrollment at com-
parably ranked private or out-of-state institutions. Thus, offering eligibility for auto-
matic admissions does not appear to increase access to selective colleges in general
even if it increases access to the best public universities in Texas.
We also find that the effects on flagship enrollment are concentrated in the most
advantaged schools in the district. Indeed, when we estimated effects by the fraction of
students at a high school that attend college, we found no evidence of effects on college
choice in the schools with the lowest college-sending rates. While the college-sending
rates of the highest performing high schools are not very high relative to Texas as a
whole, our findings suggest that offering eligibility for automatic admissions may not
be effective at accomplishing even the narrow goal of increasing access to the top pub-
lic universities for students in the most disadvantaged settings.
These results complement other research showing that ending affirmative action de-
creased enrollment of underrepresented minority students at selective colleges and de-
scriptive analyses showing that percent plans do not fully offset these reductions. While
we do not examine the effect of introducing the TTP Plan, we find little evidence that
the centerpiece of this policy – the automatic admissions guarantee – increases enroll-
ment at competitive universities or that it increases access to public flagship univer-
sities for students at the most disadvantaged schools. These results are consistent with
the claim that percent plans are unlikely to have large aggregate impacts on selective
college enrollment among students from backgrounds that send relatively few students
to these schools.
There are also some important questions that our paper does not address. Since we
use data from an urban school district, our findings may not reflect how automatic
admissions guarantees affect students in rural or suburban schools. While the effects
on students in urban school districts have clear importance for policy, the effects in
other settings do as well. The effects in rural areas are important because a goal of
the TTP Plan is to increase geographic diversity at the state’s public universities.
Likewise, the effects in suburban areas have significance because many of the criti-
cisms about the policy’s fairness stem from concerns that students in suburban dis-
tricts are at a disadvantage because it is harder to get into the top decile.
Nonetheless, it is plausible that the lack of effects on college selectivity that we find
may hold in higher-income districts as well since students in these districts who are
at the margin for being in the top decile of their class likely face smaller
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dents in our sample.
The generalizability of our findings is also limited by the regression discontinuity re-
search design that we use, which implies that our results only pertain to students at the
margin for eligibility for automatic admission. Nonetheless, the effect for the marginal
student is important for policy. For instance, these effects are relevant for thinking
about the effects of changing the class rank cutoff for eligibility for automatic admis-
sions. Furthermore, the effects of the automatic admissions guarantee might be largest
for marginal students since they are likely to be weaker than other students in the top
class rank decile on other dimensions used in college admissions decisions.
Finally, our results cannot speak to the overall effects of instituting the TTP Plan.
These effects might include strategic behavior such as choosing less competitive high
schools to make it easier to get the admissions guarantee (Cullen et al. 2013) as well as
changes in student effort and course-taking behavior. Determining whether these and
other unintended consequences of percent plans exist is an important area for future
research.
Endnotes
1There are also gaps in enrollment and completion of any type college by race and
socioeconomic status (Bailey and Dynarski, 2012), but the gaps are more pronounced
for selective colleges (Carnevale and Rose, 2004).
2Other examples of policies that are designed in part to increase selective college en-
rollment among lower-income and minority students include offering incentives to take
Advance Placement coursework (Jackson, 2010a; 2010b), mandatory college entrance
exam testing (Goodman, 2012) and expanding entrance exam testing centers (Bulman,
George 2012), and interventions that provide individualized information on college
choices and the net cost of college attendance (Avery 2010; Bettinger et al. 2012; Hoxby
and Avery 2012).
3Percent plans have also been criticized because students with weaker academic
backgrounds from less competitive high schools might be “overmatched” at a selective
college and do worse than they would at a less selective institution (Sander, 2004;
Sander and Taylor, 2012). On the other hand, students with stronger academic records
could be “undermatched” when attending a less-selective college (Bowen et al. 2009).
Fletcher and Mayer (2013) find no evidence of mismatch effects of students admitted
under the TTP Plan.
4During our study period, there were no restrictions on the number of students ad-
mitted and who could enroll under TTP. In 2009, legislation was passed limiting the
number of top ten percent admissions to the University of Texas – Austin. The policy
went into effect for the 2011 entering class at UT.
5Cohodes and Goodman (forthcoming) find that a scholarship program in Massachusetts
led to a shifting of students into lower-quality public universities from higher-quality
private universities. In contrast, the public flagship universities in Texas are more
selective than those in Massachusetts.
6A 1996 decision by the U.S. 5th Circuit Court in Hopwood v. Texas banned the use
of race in college admissions. The 2003 Supreme Court ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger
upheld a policy of using racial affirmative action. After the decision, the University of
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http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/10Texas reinstated racial preferences in admissions. In 2013, Fisher v. University of Texas
is the most recent challenge to racial affirmative action. The Supreme Court did not
rule on the constitutionality of racial preferences. Instead, it remanded the issue to the
lower 5th Circuit Court, allowing Grutter to stand. There have also been political chal-
lenges to affirmative action. For instance, voters in California, Arizona, and Michigan
have passed ballot measures that ban affirmative action.
7Both UTand TAMU offer scholarships targeted to students at schools that traditionally
do not send students to flagships. For UT Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship, students
need not be in the top ten percent to qualify, but this is a requirement of the TAMU
Century Scholarship program. Very few students obtain and use these scholarships.
For example, in 2005, only 13 students from the school district we study were awarded
the Longhorn Opportunity Scholarship and enrolled in UT.
8Institutional policies such as UT’s Coordinated Admissions Program and articulation
agreements with community colleges provide opportunities for students attending other
colleges to transfer to flagship universities.
9In contrast, other districts allow individual schools to calculate class rank, potentially
using different algorithms to determine absolute class rank and the denominator for
calculating percentile rank. In fact, our study district recently decentralized class rank
calculations, and now the individual high schools calculate class rank themselves.
10In the district, class rank is based on weighted GPA, with regular courses receiving
a weight of 4 for an “A” and advanced-courses receiving a weight of 5 for an “A”.
Grades from “local credit only” courses and courses from which students withdrew are
not included in the GPA calculations.
11UT-Austin and Texas A&M are ranked as “highly competitive” along with 7 other
colleges in Texas (of these, only UT-Dallas is a public university). Rice University is the
only university in Texas ranked as “most competitive”.
12This prediction holds in our sample. For students in the top quintile of the 11th
grade percentile class rank distribution (the sample used in the RD analysis; see below
for further details), percentile class rank between end of 11th grade and graduation in-
creases by about 2.6 percentage points (meaning that students’ relative ranking
worsens since the student ranked number 1 in the class has a percentile class rank of 1
divided by the class size), and 82 percent of students experience a worsening in per-
centile class rank. In contrast, mean GPA growth over this period is essentially zero.
Moreover, 20 percent of students in the top ten percent of their class at the end of
11th grade are not in the top ten percent of their class at graduation (only 2 percent
who were not in the top ten percent at the end of 11th grade are in the top ten percent
at graduation).
13Indeed, when we use class rank at graduation as the running variable in the RD
analysis, we do not find any evidence of effects of top ten percent status on college
choice. Notably, most of the estimates of the effect on flagship enrollment are negative
(meaning that being in the top ten percent reduces flagship enrollment), although
statistically insignificant.
14The other main way the research design could be undermined is if school officials
manipulate the calculation of class rank to increase the number of its students eligible
for automatic admissions via the TTP Plan. However, as described above, during our
study period class rank was calculated at the district central office using an automated
Daugherty et al. IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 27 of 292014, 3:10
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/10procedure, so we do not think this type of gaming was empirically important during
the time covered by our analysis.
15Because the range of percentile class rank values above the 90th percentile cutoff is
relatively small, we do not report results from “global polynomial” models that use the
complete range of class rank and control for a polynomial in class rank.
16There may be other benefits to being in the TTP not related to the Texas TTP Plan.
For instance, some scholarships may be offered to students if they are in the TTP of
their class. During our study period Texas had no such statewide policy, and we do not
know of any examples at the main schools attended by students in our sample. None-
theless, if there are such effects, then our estimates capture the “reduced form” effect
of the TTP policy provisions and any other benefits of being in the TTP.
17Two recent papers (Pei, 2011; Hullegie and Klein, 2010) propose methods to ac-
count for measurement error in the running variable in RD designs. Unfortunately we
cannot use these in our application because they require actual treatment status (in our
case, TTP status) to be observed. The measure of TTP status used in the analysis is
based on the observed (potentially noisy) class rank measure.
18Students who did not enroll in college are assigned a value of 1 for the probability
of being admitted. We obtain similar results if limiting the sample to students who en-
roll in colleges with non-missing data on the fraction of applicants admitted.
19Students who did not attend college and who therefore have no tuition are assigned
a tuition value of zero. The rationale for this decision is that not attending college has
a cost of zero. We obtain similar results when restricting the sample to students who
have non-missing tuition data.
20Such an effect could be consistent with the claim made by some that under-
qualified students admitted via preferential treatment (in this case automatic admission
by virtue of the TTP Plan) might be “overmatched” to an institution that is too de-
manding and that they would have worse outcomes than they would have had they en-
rolled in a less demanding institution (see Arcidiacono et al., 2011; Hinrichs, 2012; and
Rothstein and Yoon, 2008 for a discussion and evidence on the “mismatch hypothesis”).
However we do not interpret our findings as evidence on the “mismatch hypothesis”
because we do not find evidence that TTP status affects the selectivity of the colleges
students attend.
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